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Innovation of Inventory Regarding Decision Making Power

Abstract

The study of decision making attempts to understand fundamental ability to process multiple alternatives and to choose an optimal course of action, an ability that has been studied by various disciplines with different theoretical assumptions and measurement techniques, although with relatively little integration of findings. Decision Making Power (DMP) among Women takes into consideration all the dimensions of decision making, i.e., Self Identity Decisions (SID), Family and Household Decisions (FHD), Social Decisions (SD), Financial Decisions (FD), Legal and Political Decisions (LPD), Sex, Marriage and Reproductive Decisions (SMRD), Descendant Decisions (DD). The innovated inventory is confirmed through normality test and correlation matrices.

Keywords: Innovation, Inventory, Power, Fundamental.

Introduction

Decision making is an intellectual or rational process. As a mental exercise, it involves considerable deliberation and thoughtful consideration of various factors influencing the choice. It is the end process preceded by reasoning and judgment (Kuldeep, 2012). Each step in the decision making process may include social, cognitive and cultural obstacles to successfully negotiating dilemmas. It has been suggested that becoming more aware of these obstacles allows one to better anticipate and overcome them (Pijanowski, 2009). Postmes, et. al (2001) and Communication Theory (2012) cited four stages of decision making developed by B. Aubrey Fisher, which should be involved in all group decision making. These stages, or sometimes called phases, are important for the decision making process to begin. Fisher's model is a development model consisting of four stages. An accord is emerging within a group by going through these stages. The influence of each member on decision-making depends on several factors such as the resources that each member contributes, which is the basis of the relative resource theory (Robertson 1990; Webster 1995; Martínez and Polo 1999), culture which provides the basis for the theory of resources in a culture context (Rodman 1972), the degree of involvement and role specialisation (Corfman 1985), the quality of the marital relationship (Baxter 1984; Kirchler and Praher 1990), who has made decisions in the past (Corfman and Lehmann 1987; Barry and Oliver 1996) or the influence exerted by children (Jenkins 1979; Foxman, Tansuhaj, and Ekstrom 1989; Mangleburg 1990). The constraints on women's physical mobility in many parts of the world restrict their ability to make independent decisions. Women in countries such as India, Egypt, and Bangladesh are governed by social norms that restrict their physical mobility, referred to in the literature as female seclusion. This seclusion involves the veiling of head and face in some instances, as well as restrictions on unaccompanied travel to such places as shops, pharmacies, or hospitals, and limits on direct contact with unrelated males. Thus, even in instances where women wish to make decisions regarding household consumption, expenditures, or health care, they may need help and agreement from other family members, particularly the husband or mother-in-law, in actually conducting these transactions (Bruce, et. al, 1995). Household decision making process is not influenced by education of women all the time. There is also a traditional trend to take decisions about family planning which is dominated by mother-in-laws in most of the South Asian countries. In their study, they used the survey data of 1996 and the sample size was 1020 married women from Pakistan. They considered urban residence, age, communication, family planning, household decision making and religion (Kadir et al., 2003)

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Review of Literature

There are few studies that examine how intra-familial decision-making power may affect women's ability to access and use maternal health services (Ganle, et.al, 2015). Bertocchi, Brunetti and Torricelli (2012) investigated the determinants of family decision making power on economic and financial choices by considering individual characteristics of each spouse, household characteristics, and family background factors by using data over the period 1989-2010, which are drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth. They found the probability that the wife is in charge of economic and financial decisions increased with the difference between her years of age, level of education, income, husband's characteristics, as well as household characteristics such as family size and wealth. Much of the existing family research is not reflective of current, twenty-first century family decision-making (Lackman and Lanasa, 1993; Belch and Willis, 2001). The family as the unit of analysis has been relatively neglected by research (Commuri and Gentry, 2000; Beatty and Talpade, 1994), with Burns (1993) highlighting the lack of research into the family unit, which means that many nuances surrounding family decision-making in the consumption context may have been overlooked. What little research that has been conducted on the family and family decision-making has often had a very restricted focus, e.g. concentrating on traditional two parent / nuclear families or dealing with families characterised as having a "normal" family structure (Sheth, 1974). Early family studies also focussed on specific areas in which products were deemed to be husband or wife dominant. This sex-based role structure allowed researchers to identify gendered product provinces, with husbands having most control and influence over decisions relating to the choice of cars (Belch et al., 1985; Mohan, 1995), television sets (Belch et al., 1985; Mohan, 1995), lawn mowers (Mohan, 1995), life and other insurance (Davis and Rigaux, 1974), and gardening equipment and home repairs (Wolgast, 1958). Wives were found to dominate the choice of household appliances (Mohan, 1995 and Wolgast, 1958), furniture and breakfast cereals (Belch et al., 1985), clothing (Mohan, 1995; Davis and Rigaux, 1974), food and non-alcoholic beverages, and household cleaning products (Davis and Rigaux, 1974). Such early research has been criticized for failing to account for the role other family members (most notably children) might play in influencing decisions. This criticism led Davis (1976) to claim that it is a serious oversimplification to talk about a product category as simply husband dominant, wife dominant or both. Recognizing that family decision-making is a joint process (Davis, 1976; Burns, 1992; Shepherd and Woodruff, 1988) there have been further family studies which collect data from a wider range of family members (Ekström, Tansuhaj and Foxman, 1987). Malhotra and Mather (1997) conducted an empirical study on household decision making power regarding financial matters using survey data of 1460 young women. The predictors included in that study were women

education, employment, social background, life course stage, family structure and husband characteristics i.e., age, wage, employment and education. It was found that participation in household decisions was conditioned by a larger social context and it depended on the structure of the division of labour, access to information, economic resources and the domestic power relations of a society. Women's participation in decision making was also related to the educational status.

Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of this paper are to:

1. Confirm the model and inventory regarding Decision Making Power
2. Test the various components of innovated model of Decision Making Power

Methodology

An inventory (Model) was devised under the study regarding 'Decision Making Power' (DMP) with its seven components. These seven components extracted from 166 items of inventory were arranged and classified as: Self Identity Decisions (SID); Family and Household Decisions (FHD); Social Decisions (SD); Financial Decisions (FD); Legal and Political Decisions (LPD); Sex, Marriage and Reproductive Decisions (SMRD); and Descendant Decisions (DD). Under the study, the various parameters were evaluated in relation to sample so that the model of decision making power shall be standardised. Normality tests were used to determine if a data set was well-modeled by a normal distribution and to compute how likely it was for a random variable underlying the data set to be normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test was applied to check whether a sample came from a normally distributed population. In this study, for an alpha level of 0.05, a data set with a p-value of 0.02 rejects the null hypothesis that the data are from a normally distributed population. In addition to correlation metrics between factors, Skewness with its Standard Error and Kurtosis with its Standard Error were also applied.

Results and Discussion

As per Table 1, the skewness and kurtosis measures of egalitarian, feminine, masculine, familial and non specific decision makers are found close to zero in DMP as well as among all components of inventory and z-values of skewness and kurtosis are also observed within ± 1.96 . This implies that data are approximately normally distributed in terms of skewness and kurtosis. The Shapiro Wilk test ($p > 0.05$) (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965; Razali and Wah, 2011) reveal that scores of egalitarian, feminine, masculine, familial and non-specific decision makers among all components of inventory are approximately normally distributed for all its components (Cramer, 1998; Cramer and Hawett, 2004; Doane and Seward, 2011).

Furthermore, Table 2 observes that skewness and kurtosis measures at low, moderate and high levels of DMP are again observed close to zero in DMP and also among all components of inventory and z-values of skewness and kurtosis are also found within ± 1.96 . This implies that data are little skewed and kurtotic for low, moderate and high

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levels of inventory. The Shapiro Wilk test ($p > 0.05$) (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965; Razali and Wah, 2011) reveal that scores of low, moderate and high levels of DMP among all components of inventory are approximately normally distributed for all its components (Cramer, 1998; Cramer and Hawett, 2004; Doane and Seward, 2011).

Inter correlation between seven dimensions of DMP is shown in Table 3. The dimensions of inventory reveal less correlation with each other, supporting the factor loadings through principal component analysis. SID have significantly negative correlation with LPD, $r(1198) = -0.16, p < 0.05$ and highly significant positive correlation with SMRD, $r(1198) = 0.11, p < 0.01$. FHD are significantly and positively correlated, $r(1198) = 0.16, p < 0.01$ with SD. Highly significant positive correlation of FHD is also observed with FD, $r(1198) = 0.14, p < 0.01$; LPD, $r(1198) = 0.16, p < 0.01$; and DD, $r(555) = 0.18, p < 0.01$. SD is negatively correlated with SMRD, $r(1198) = -0.17, p < 0.05$. Significantly positive correlation of SD, $r(1198) = 0.15, p < 0.05$, is also found with FD. SD has also shown highly significant positive correlation with LPD, $r(1198) = 0.11, p < 0.01$ and DD, $r(555) = 0.12, p < 0.01$. FD shows highly significant positive correlations with LPD, $r(1198) = 0.15, p < 0.01$ and DD, $r(555) = 0.14, p < 0.01$, but negative correlation with SMRD, $r(1198) = -0.12, p < 0.01$. LPD and DD are positively correlated with each other, $r(555) = 0.18, p < 0.01$.

As per Table 4, there is negative correlation of DMP, $r(1198) = -0.19, p < 0.05$, with SID; while positive correlation of DMP is found with SID, $r(1198) = 0.18, p < 0.01$; and LPD, $r(1198) = 0.19, p < 0.01$. Classifying the inventory among never married and ever married women, no significant correlation of DMP is found with any dimension of inventory.

Table 5 observes correlation of all dimensions of inventory and its broad factors with egalitarian, feminine, familial, masculine and non specific decision makers. Egalitarian decision makers

have shown highly significant positive correlation with SID, $r(1198) = 0.50, p < 0.01$; FD, $r(1198) = 0.20, p < 0.01$; and DMP among ever married women, $r(598) = 0.25, p < 0.01$. Negative correlations at significantly high levels are found of egalitarian decision makers with FHD, $r(1198) = -0.49, p < 0.01$; SD, $r(1198) = -0.11, p < 0.01$; SMRD, $r(1198) = -0.33, p < 0.01$; and DMP among never married women, $r(558) = -0.17, p < 0.01$. Feminine decision making is positively and highly significant correlated with FHD, $r(1198) = 0.32, p < 0.01$; SD, $r(1198) = 0.08, p < 0.01$; FD, $r(1198) = 0.46, p < 0.01$; LPD, $r(1198) = 0.66, p < 0.01$; SMRD, $r(1198) = 0.39, p < 0.01$; and DMP among ever married women, $r(598) = 0.26, p < 0.01$. However, negative correlation is found with feminine decision making, $r(1198) = -0.30, p < 0.01$. Similarly, familial decision making has shown highly significant negative correlation with SID, $r(1198) = -0.11, p < 0.01$; SD, $r(1198) = -0.12, p < 0.01$; FD, $r(1198) = -0.20, p < 0.01$ and DMP among ever married women, $r(598) = -0.09, p < 0.01$. However, familial decision making have shown highly significant positive correlation with four dimensions of the inventory, i.e., FHD, $r(1198) = 0.15, p < 0.01$; LPD, $r(1198) = 0.22, p < 0.01$; SMRD, $r(1198) = 0.26, p < 0.01$; and DMP among never married women, $r(598) = 0.12, p < 0.01$. Masculine decision makers have shown negatively high significant correlation with SID, $r(1198) = -0.30, p < 0.01$; FD, $r(1198) = -0.20, p < 0.01$; LPD, $r(1198) = -0.31, p < 0.01$; and DMP among ever married women, $r(598) = -0.36, p < 0.01$. Two dimensions of inventory namely FHD, $r(1198) = 0.37, p < 0.01$ and SD, $r(1198) = 0.24, p < 0.01$, have shown positively and significantly high correlation with masculine decision makers. Non specific decision makers have shown negatively significant correlation, $r(598) = -0.09, p < 0.05$, with DMP among never married women. However, positive correlation of non specific decision makers are observed with FD, $r(1198) = 0.14, p < 0.01$; and DMP among ever married women, $r(598) = 0.08, p < 0.01$.

Table 1: Sample Distribution and Normality test of DMP as per Decision Makers

Variables	Skewness	SE Skewness	Z- value Skewness	Kurtosis	SE Kurtosis	Z- value Kurtosis	Normality Test (Shapiro-Wilk)			
							Statistic	df	Sig.	
Self Identity Decisions	Egalitarian	.04	.07	.57	-.19	.14	1.35	.746	506	0.21
	Feminine	.02	.07	.28	-.06	.14	.42	.880	35	0.85
	Masculine	.06	.07	.85	.09	.14	.64	.504	139	0.34
	Familial	.03	.07	.42	.07	.14	.50	.644	520	0.95
Family and Household Decisions	Egalitarian	.10	.07	1.42	-.08	.14	.57	.872	160	0.35
	Feminine	.04	.07	.57	.19	.14	1.35	.805	33	0.67
	Masculine	.13	.07	1.85	.11	.14	.78	.588	573	0.68
	Familial	.06	.07	.85	-.14	.14	1.0	.660	424	0.19
	Non Specific	.05	.07	.71	.02	.14	.14	.719	10	0.28
Social Decisions	Egalitarian	-.12	.07	1.71	-.08	.14	.57	.734	124	0.71
	Feminine	.01	.07	.14	.09	.14	1.35	.493	73	0.19
	Masculine	.04	.07	.57	.06	.14	.42	.807	808	0.64
	Familial	.09	.07	1.28	.18	.14	1.28	.698	195	0.83

Financial Decisions	Egalitarian	.05	.07	.71	-.02	.14	.14	.895	254	0.53
	Feminine	.09	.07	1.28	.17	.14	1.21	.499	47	0.72
	Masculine	.04	.07	.57	-.16	.14	1.14	.639	501	0.93
	Familial	.07	.07	1.0	.15	.14	1.07	.465	397	0.37
	Non Specific	.09	.07	1.28	.17	.14	1.21	.751	01	0.28
Legal and Political Decisions	Egalitarian	.02	.07	.28	.19	.14	1.35	.913	42	0.65
	Feminine	.10	.07	1.42	.15	.14	1.07	.240	47	0.41
	Masculine	-.10	.07	1.42	-.18	.14	1.28	.446	812	0.82
	Familial	.08	.07	1.14	.11	.14	.78	.564	218	0.92
	Non Specific	.09	.07	1.28	.14	.14	1.00	.677	81	0.68
Sex, Marriage and Reproductive Decisions	Egalitarian	.06	.07	.85	-.12	.14	.85	.895	190	0.37
	Feminine	.09	.07	1.28	-.14	.14	1.00	.653	26	0.31
	Masculine	.09	.07	1.28	.07	.14	.50	.661	582	0.65
	Familial	.02	.07	.28	.16	.14	1.14	.781	400	0.83
	Non Specific	.05	.07	.71	.13	.14	.92	.604	02	0.63
Descendent Decisions	Egalitarian	-.06	.10	.60	-.18	.20	.90	.850	144	0.95
	Feminine	.04	.10	.40	.18	.20	.90	.905	17	0.46
	Masculine	.07	.10	.70	-.12	.20	.60	.813	356	0.19
	Familial	.10	.10	1.00	.10	.20	.50	.873	37	0.13
	Non Specific	.03	.10	.30	.14	.20	.70	.778	03	0.72
Decision Making Power EM	Egalitarian	.56	.49	1.14	-.72	.95	.75	.758	22	0.81
	Feminine	.28	.32	.87	.00	.63	.00	.800	55	0.29
	Masculine	.10	.12	.83	.12	.40	.30	.805	142	0.19
	Familial	.27	.79	.34	.19	.25	.76	.811	374	0.36
	Non Specific	-.17	.10	1.70	.10	1.58	.06	.752	7	0.88
Decision Making Power NM	Egalitarian	-.18	.23	.43	-.60	.46	1.30	.842	106	0.25
	Feminine	-.09	.44	.20	-.04	.85	.04	.804	28	0.29
	Masculine	-.19	.18	1.05	-.18	.37	.48	.835	170	0.41
	Familial	-.19	.14	1.35	-.14	.29	.48	.831	278	0.17
	Non Specific	-.48	.13	.90	-.07	.03	1.85	.817	18	0.13
Decision Making Power	Egalitarian	0.11	0.21	0.52	-0.08	0.42	0.19	.845	128	0.23
	Feminine	0.14	0.26	0.53	0.09	0.52	0.17	.896	83	0.65
	Masculine	0.06	0.09	0.66	0.03	0.19	0.15	.835	652	0.28
	Familial	0.09	0.13	0.69	0.15	0.27	0.55	.872	312	0.47
	Non Specific	0.15	0.46	0.32	0.77	0.90	0.85	.829	25	0.61

Based on Field Survey

N= 1200 EM denotes Ever Married

NM denotes Never Married

Table 2: Sample Distribution and Normality Test of DMP as per its Levels

Variables	Skewness	SE Skewness	Z- value Skewness	Kurtosis	SE Kurtosis	Z- value Kurtosis	Normality Test (Shapiro-Wilk)			
							Statistic	df	Sig.	
Self Identity Decisions	Low	-.16	.10	1.60	-.12	.21	0.57	.810	498	1.26
	Moderate	.07	.09	0.77	-.12	.19	0.63	.821	637	1.36
	High	.08	.29	0.27	-.03	.08	0.37	.775	65	1.98
Family and Household Decisions	Low	.13	.08	1.62	.01	.00	0.00	.806	843	1.25
	Moderate	.09	.14	0.64	-.40	.29	1.37	.453	268	1.69
	High	-.10	.25	0.40	.44	.50	0.88	.514	89	1.24
Social Decisions	Low	.08	.08	1.00	.04	.16	0.25	.701	921	1.78
	Moderate	-.03	.18	0.16	-.06	.35	0.17	.487	183	1.23
	High	.36	.24	1.50	.03	.08	0.37	.558	96	1.54
Financial Decisions	Low	.05	.08	0.62	.28	.16	1.75	.757	856	1.27
	Moderate	-.01	.14	0.07	-.36	.29	1.24	.594	268	0.36
	High	.03	.27	0.11	.01	.04	0.25	.124	76	0.98

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Legal and Political Decisions	Low	.07	.07	1.00	.18	.15	1.20	.522	1047	3.25
	Moderate	.02	.24	0.08	-.73	.48	1.52	.629	98	0.56
	High	.05	.32	0.15	.27	.63	0.42	.124	55	0.20
Sex, Marriage and Reproductive Decisions	Low	.03	.07	0.42	-.09	.15	0.60	.714	952	1.35
	Moderate	.08	.16	0.50	.10	.32	0.31	.412	219	1.86
	High	.61	.43	1.41	.03	.04	0.75	.453	29	0.63
Descendent Decisions	Low	.02	.11	0.18	.02	.03	0.66	.871	425	1.73
	Moderate	-.38	.23	1.65	-.71	.46	1.54	.632	105	1.24
	High	-.07	.44	0.15	.01	.07	0.14	.906	27	0.09
Decision Making Power EM	Low	.03	.11	0.27	-.10	.23	0.43	.916	441	1.28
	Moderate	.04	.03	1.33	-.49	.60	0.81	.923	60	1.64
	High	-.07	.24	0.29	-.19	.48	0.39	.947	99	1.53
Decision Making Power NM	Low	.21	.12	1.75	.18	.25	0.72	.791	370	1.80
	Moderate	.06	.18	0.33	-.09	.36	0.25	.729	179	1.61
	High	.42	.33	1.27	-.03	.65	0.04	.928	51	1.01
Decision Making Power	Low	0.08	0.08	1.00	0.08	0.16	0.50	.856	870	1.32
	Moderate	0.05	0.18	0.27	-0.14	0.36	0.38	.796	180	1.65
	High	-0.23	0.19	1.21	-0.04	0.39	0.10	.792	150	1.45

Based on Field Survey

N=1200

EM denotes Ever Married

NM denotes Never Married

Table 3: Inter Correlation Metrics between Dimensions of DMP

Dimensions		SID	FHD	SD	FD	LPD	SMRD
FHD	Pearson Correlation	-.150					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.081					
SD	Pearson Correlation	.132	.163				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.272	.029				
FD	Pearson Correlation	.10	.142	.157			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.959	.000	.047			
LPD	Pearson Correlation	-.162	.161	.114	.159		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.031	.000	.000	.000		
SMRD	Pearson Correlation	.116	-.16	-.171	-.127	-.115	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.822	.014	.000	.601	
DD ^a	Pearson Correlation	.14	.183	.129	.141	.185	.119
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.924	.000	.002	.001	.000	.643

n=1200

^a denotes

n=557

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4: Correlation Metrics between broad Factors

Dimensions		Decision Making Power		
		DMP NM ^b	DMP EM ^b	DMP ^c
SID	Pearson Correlation	-.110	-.174	-.197
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.784	.070	.001
FHD	Pearson Correlation	.139	-.170	-.130
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.334	.868	.904
SD	Pearson Correlation	.105	.185	.182
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.036	.004
FD	Pearson Correlation	-.204	.188	.110
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.015
LPD	Pearson Correlation	-.131	.150	.197
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.442	.000	.001
SMRD	Pearson Correlation	.172	.280	.211
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.490	.701
DD ^a	Pearson Correlation	-	-.210	-.210
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.616	.616

^a denotes n=557

^b denotes n=600

^c denotes n=1200

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

DMP NM denoted Decision Making Power among Never Married

DMP EM denotes Decision Making Power among Ever Married

Table 5: Correlation Metrics between broad Factors

Dimensions		Decision Makers				
		Egalitarian	Feminine	Familial	Masculine	Non Specific
SID	Pearson Correlation	0.509 **	-0.302 **	-0.119 **	-0.302 **	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-
FHD	Pearson Correlation	-0.498 **	0.325 **	0.154 **	0.376 **	-0.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.074
SD	Pearson Correlation	-0.112 **	0.083 **	-0.124 **	0.240 **	-
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	
FD	Pearson Correlation	0.200 **	0.464 **	-0.207 **	-0.209 **	0.149 **
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
LPD	Pearson Correlation	0.051	0.661 **	0.225 **	-0.316 **	-0.028
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.338
SMRD	Pearson Correlation	-0.338 **	0.392 **	0.260 **	-0.160	-0.028
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.578	0.338
DD ^a	Pearson Correlation	-0.483	0.135	0.367	0.319	0.056
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.185
DMP EM ^b	Pearson Correlation	0.256 **	0.260 **	-0.096 *	-0.364 **	0.087 *
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.034
DMP NM ^b	Pearson Correlation	-0.178 **	0.400	0.129 **	0.059	-0.098 *
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.325	0.002	0.14	0.016

n=1200
^a denotes n=557
^b denotes n=600

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

NM denoted Never Married

EM denotes Ever Married

Summary and Conclusion

Decision Making Power (DMP) among Women comprises 166 items of inventory with 70 per cent to 90 per cent representation. All its items in seven dimensions have shown highly significant differences. Data is skewed and kurtotic among all dimensions of inventory and does not differ significantly from normality. The scores of DMP are approximately normally distributed for all its dimensions. The dimensions of inventory reveal less correlation with each other, supporting the factor loadings through principal component analysis. The study shows mean scores of 2.0 to 4.1 among the 33 items of 1st component of inventory, i.e., Self Identity Decisions (SID). It implies that decision making power in case of SID revolves between masculine and feminine decision makers. However, significant familial decisions are also observed in this component of inventory. In case of 27 items of Family and Household Decisions (FHD), the mean scores ranges from 2.0 to 4.2 (masculine to feminine), though most of the mean scores (3.2) also reveal familial decision makers. Among 22 items of Social Decisions (SD) the mean scores mostly revolve around 3.3, showing more familial decision power on SD. The 32 items of Financial Decisions (FD) depict masculine decisions by mean scores of 2.1 to 2.8. Similar is case with 20 items of Legal and Political Decisions (LPD), where masculine decision making power is more by mean scores of 2.9. The mean scores of 12 items of Sex, Marriage and Reproductive Decisions (SMRD) are

scattered around masculine, familial and feminine decision makers ranging between 2.1 to 4.1 mean scores. However, 20 items of Descendent Decisions (DD) mostly comprise the mean scores of 3.8-.39, showing male dominance in DD. Overall, among all 166 items of inventory (DMP), the mean scores are mostly from 2-3, depicting masculine and familial decision making power in the family.

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